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Here is an article that argues for objective morality (not culturally defined):

Goodness by Gallup

Gregory Koukl

While some moral values are subject to the whims of society, can that explain all morality?

I often argue for the existence of God on the basis of the observation that it seems clear that there are moral things that exist in the universe. There are moral rules that are immaterial things, but they are still real. I often give as an example the moral rule that torturing babies for fun is wrong. That strikes me as reliable moral rule. In other words, torturing babies for fun seems to be a moral fact that is not tied to culture in any way, shape, or form. It's a moral absolute.
If there is even one moral absolute, one has to ask the question, What kind of thing is it? Clearly, it is not physical. If it is not physical, then it is non-physical. If it is not material, it is immaterial. What we have determined, then, is an immaterial thing exists, which means that the immaterial world must exist to possess that immaterial thing. This opens up the possibility of a lot of other things existing in that immaterial world other than just single moral absolutes--possibly, the existence of God in that immaterial world.

It also invites the question, Where does such a thing come from? I have argued that the best explanation for where a moral rule comes from is a moral Rule-Giver. The Giver here would be a capital G because I'm referring to a Personal Being who gives moral rules to His creation. Therefore, if moral rules exist, it seems to be a good argument for the existence of God. That is the way the moral argument for God's existence goes. My modus operandi here is to try to get the inference to the best explanation. It seems that there are moral truths, and it seems that the fact of moral truths imply the existence of a moral Rule-Giver. That seems to be the best explanation.

There are counters to this. When I ask what best explains the existence of any moral rules, and then I say a moral Rule-Giver--God--others can say that this is simply a convention of society. Morality was invented to help civilization to survive. Virtually every single time that I give a talk on this issue, I get this question. I believe that morality does help civilization to survive, but I don't think that is what morality is. Nor does that explain where morality came from. I think it is an inadequate explanation.

I want to give you a tactic to respond to this claim. The tactic is the Columbo tactic and I think it is fair for you to ask for a justification for the point when someone raises this issue. I think it is fair to ask the question, Why do you think this is a good explanation of where morality came from? It is very important to ask them to give an argument. If they are going to give a point of view, it is fair for you to ask for the justification. Very few people will be able to do that. I think this shows that the real appeal to this answer is not that it is justifiable, but because it gets rid of the need for God. That is the big payoff.

I'll will give you a couple of reasons why I don't think this is a reasonable explanation for the existence of morality. And if it is not, then you must look elsewhere for the source of morals, and I still think then that the best source will be a personal God.

The first thing that you could ask is, Who took the vote? This is the point that Frank Beckwith, a lecturer in philosophy at UNLV and author of Politically Correct Death-- someone who lectures frequently on moral issues--has said. I was talking to him about this issue recently and that was the first thing out of his mouth. It makes it sound like everybody voted that this is what is best for society. Well, who took the vote? I wasn't there, were you? So that is not an explanation for the notion that this is really where morality comes from.
Someone could say that maybe morals aren't the result of a vote, but they evolved through trial and error in society until we kind of arrived at an operational consensus. In other words, this could be an adequate explanation without having at the same time to say that morality was developed in a culturally self-conscious kind of way. If that is the case, then there are some other problems that seem to obtain from this situation because it seems to me that if morality was simply a matter of convention then you could easily change morality by changing convention. But it doesn't seem that morality is quite that flexible.

Let's all decide that things that were formerly considered immoral we'll now consider moral. That is all there is to it. It does seem to be the case that things viewed as wrong at one time are not viewed as wrong at another time. This happens. The length of a skirt hem, for example. The definitions of modesty. It may be that some things are flexible in that regard, but this just says that some moral sensitivities may go through a process of change. It certainly doesn't describe all morality.

To make the point, can you imagine it possible for it to be right to punish the innocent because he is innocent--simply because most of us agreed that would be our new morality? The point I am making is that if it is just a matter of our convention, can we change the convention and instead of punishing the guilty we will punish the innocent? Doesn't it still seem to be wrong to do so, even if we all agree that it is okay? It doesn't seem that we can change morality and have it still be the same kind of thing just because we decide to do so by the conventions of society.

By the way, many moral rules don't fit this explanation anyway. Some things seem to be immoral whether they related to society's flourishing or not. I mentioned earlier, torturing babies for fun. It strikes me that one could have a very fine, functioning society and still torture babies for the fun of it. As a matter of fact, society could function even better. In other words, you could make the issue of torturing babies into a commercial enterprise and make more money on it and have a thriving industry. In other words, the offense of torturing babies for fun seems to have nothing to do with the flourishing of society. It seems to have to do with the fact that torturing babies for fun is wrong. It's not the kind of thing that you ought to do.

It seems to follow that if we could change morality in that fashion then you could identify a whole class of people that aren't good for society in your view of things and just exterminate them. That's what the Nazis attempted to do with the Jews. They got pretty close. What was their rationale? Society is better without them. But it does seem that that kind of extermination was patently immoral. And it wasn't immoral because it made the society less viable, as this definition would suggest. Many moral rules don't fit this explanation.
By the way, and fourth, this is not an argument for individuals to be moral in any given instance. This only really works for the majority to be characteristically moral. In other words, it seems that I would have an obligation to make sure others are moral, but not me. Why should I be moral in any given instance? Why shouldn't I steal from everybody else? Because if everybody did that then society would go goofy. Yes, but everybody doesn't do that, and as long as everybody doesn't do that and most people are moral then we have the foundations of society and I can do whatever I want because that isn't going to ultimately destroy the foundation of morality.

But people don't justify things that seem immoral that way. They say torturing babies for fun is wrong. Period. No further justification is necessary.

You see, the good of society is itself a moral concept. All you've done here is assert another moral rule, which kind of begs the question. In other words, why should I care what's good for society or not? This society explanation seems to depend for its force on the fact that some primal moral concepts are already in place. Ultimately, then, it can't explain morality in general because morality must be in place before you can even offer this alternative. It can explain certain moral rules that have to do with the welfare of society, but it can't explain the existence of morality itself.

Ultimately, this is not a good explanation for the existence of morality. It doesn't work. It doesn't seem to be what people really mean when they talk about morality. It doesn't seem like anybody took a vote. It doesn't seem like we can change morality by changing convention. It is not an argument for any individual person to be moral. If you appeal to the good of society, you are already appealing to a moral rule that is in place and you need a further justification for that moral rule. This thing falls apart on about six different counts which makes the point that society and the conventions of society are not an adequate explanation for the existence of morality. It might explain some morals, but it certainly doesn't explain the whole lot of them. If it doesn't explain the whole lot of them, you must go somewhere else for an explanation.

It seems, therefore, that if moral rules are not merely social conventions then the moral argument for the existence of God still stands as the inference for the best explanation given the fact that morals do exist.

05-17-2004, 11:36 PM	#5
aquadude whore Join Date: May 2004 Location: peeing in the pool Posts: 881/0.53 Threads: 3 Friends Network	Re: Morality Here is an article that argues for objective morality (not culturally defined): Goodness by Gallup Gregory Koukl While some moral values are subject to the whims of society, can that explain all morality? I often argue for the existence of God on the basis of the observation that it seems clear that there are moral things that exist in the universe. There are moral rules that are immaterial things, but they are still real. I often give as an example the moral rule that torturing babies for fun is wrong. That strikes me as reliable moral rule. In other words, torturing babies for fun seems to be a moral fact that is not tied to culture in any way, shape, or form. It's a moral absolute. If there is even one moral absolute, one has to ask the question, What kind of thing is it? Clearly, it is not physical. If it is not physical, then it is non-physical. If it is not material, it is immaterial. What we have determined, then, is an immaterial thing exists, which means that the immaterial world must exist to possess that immaterial thing. This opens up the possibility of a lot of other things existing in that immaterial world other than just single moral absolutes--possibly, the existence of God in that immaterial world. It also invites the question, Where does such a thing come from? I have argued that the best explanation for where a moral rule comes from is a moral Rule-Giver. The Giver here would be a capital G because I'm referring to a Personal Being who gives moral rules to His creation. Therefore, if moral rules exist, it seems to be a good argument for the existence of God. That is the way the moral argument for God's existence goes. My modus operandi here is to try to get the inference to the best explanation. It seems that there are moral truths, and it seems that the fact of moral truths imply the existence of a moral Rule-Giver. That seems to be the best explanation. There are counters to this. When I ask what best explains the existence of any moral rules, and then I say a moral Rule-Giver--God--others can say that this is simply a convention of society. Morality was invented to help civilization to survive. Virtually every single time that I give a talk on this issue, I get this question. I believe that morality does help civilization to survive, but I don't think that is what morality is. Nor does that explain where morality came from. I think it is an inadequate explanation. I want to give you a tactic to respond to this claim. The tactic is the Columbo tactic and I think it is fair for you to ask for a justification for the point when someone raises this issue. I think it is fair to ask the question, Why do you think this is a good explanation of where morality came from? It is very important to ask them to give an argument. If they are going to give a point of view, it is fair for you to ask for the justification. Very few people will be able to do that. I think this shows that the real appeal to this answer is not that it is justifiable, but because it gets rid of the need for God. That is the big payoff. I'll will give you a couple of reasons why I don't think this is a reasonable explanation for the existence of morality. And if it is not, then you must look elsewhere for the source of morals, and I still think then that the best source will be a personal God. The first thing that you could ask is, Who took the vote? This is the point that Frank Beckwith, a lecturer in philosophy at UNLV and author of Politically Correct Death-- someone who lectures frequently on moral issues--has said. I was talking to him about this issue recently and that was the first thing out of his mouth. It makes it sound like everybody voted that this is what is best for society. Well, who took the vote? I wasn't there, were you? So that is not an explanation for the notion that this is really where morality comes from. Someone could say that maybe morals aren't the result of a vote, but they evolved through trial and error in society until we kind of arrived at an operational consensus. In other words, this could be an adequate explanation without having at the same time to say that morality was developed in a culturally self-conscious kind of way. If that is the case, then there are some other problems that seem to obtain from this situation because it seems to me that if morality was simply a matter of convention then you could easily change morality by changing convention. But it doesn't seem that morality is quite that flexible. Let's all decide that things that were formerly considered immoral we'll now consider moral. That is all there is to it. It does seem to be the case that things viewed as wrong at one time are not viewed as wrong at another time. This happens. The length of a skirt hem, for example. The definitions of modesty. It may be that some things are flexible in that regard, but this just says that some moral sensitivities may go through a process of change. It certainly doesn't describe all morality. To make the point, can you imagine it possible for it to be right to punish the innocent because he is innocent--simply because most of us agreed that would be our new morality? The point I am making is that if it is just a matter of our convention, can we change the convention and instead of punishing the guilty we will punish the innocent? Doesn't it still seem to be wrong to do so, even if we all agree that it is okay? It doesn't seem that we can change morality and have it still be the same kind of thing just because we decide to do so by the conventions of society. By the way, many moral rules don't fit this explanation anyway. Some things seem to be immoral whether they related to society's flourishing or not. I mentioned earlier, torturing babies for fun. It strikes me that one could have a very fine, functioning society and still torture babies for the fun of it. As a matter of fact, society could function even better. In other words, you could make the issue of torturing babies into a commercial enterprise and make more money on it and have a thriving industry. In other words, the offense of torturing babies for fun seems to have nothing to do with the flourishing of society. It seems to have to do with the fact that torturing babies for fun is wrong. It's not the kind of thing that you ought to do. It seems to follow that if we could change morality in that fashion then you could identify a whole class of people that aren't good for society in your view of things and just exterminate them. That's what the Nazis attempted to do with the Jews. They got pretty close. What was their rationale? Society is better without them. But it does seem that that kind of extermination was patently immoral. And it wasn't immoral because it made the society less viable, as this definition would suggest. Many moral rules don't fit this explanation. By the way, and fourth, this is not an argument for individuals to be moral in any given instance. This only really works for the majority to be characteristically moral. In other words, it seems that I would have an obligation to make sure others are moral, but not me. Why should I be moral in any given instance? Why shouldn't I steal from everybody else? Because if everybody did that then society would go goofy. Yes, but everybody doesn't do that, and as long as everybody doesn't do that and most people are moral then we have the foundations of society and I can do whatever I want because that isn't going to ultimately destroy the foundation of morality. But people don't justify things that seem immoral that way. They say torturing babies for fun is wrong. Period. No further justification is necessary. You see, the good of society is itself a moral concept. All you've done here is assert another moral rule, which kind of begs the question. In other words, why should I care what's good for society or not? This society explanation seems to depend for its force on the fact that some primal moral concepts are already in place. Ultimately, then, it can't explain morality in general because morality must be in place before you can even offer this alternative. It can explain certain moral rules that have to do with the welfare of society, but it can't explain the existence of morality itself. Ultimately, this is not a good explanation for the existence of morality. It doesn't work. It doesn't seem to be what people really mean when they talk about morality. It doesn't seem like anybody took a vote. It doesn't seem like we can change morality by changing convention. It is not an argument for any individual person to be moral. If you appeal to the good of society, you are already appealing to a moral rule that is in place and you need a further justification for that moral rule. This thing falls apart on about six different counts which makes the point that society and the conventions of society are not an adequate explanation for the existence of morality. It might explain some morals, but it certainly doesn't explain the whole lot of them. If it doesn't explain the whole lot of them, you must go somewhere else for an explanation. It seems, therefore, that if moral rules are not merely social conventions then the moral argument for the existence of God still stands as the inference for the best explanation given the fact that morals do exist.

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